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THIS essay was originally the 'opener' of a colloquium
of teachers of English at the Welsh universities. As such
I felt it my prime duty to sow discord, if not (as I hope)
among my auditors, at least between my auditors and
myself. To that end, I refashioned, in the unkindest manner
possible, the already unkind words which Eliot used of
Thomas Hobbes,1 presenting Thomas Stearns Eliot as 'one
of those extraordinary landloupers whom the chaotic
motions of the early twentieth century tossed into an
eminence which they hardly deserved and which—at least
as yet—they have never lost'. An even more extraordinary
landlouper would of course be Ezra Pound, but, to my
relief, we have to deal with him only accidentally.
A notable characteristic which Hobbes shared with
Eliot but not, I think, with Pound, is what Eliot variously
calls a 'power over words',2 'the gift of words', 'the gift of
language'.3 Certain of Hobbes's phrases have stamped
themselves indelibly on the English memory; two at least
of what Eliot calls his coinages—'objective correlative' and
'dissociation of sensibility'—acquired a currency by which,
in 1947, he declared himself 'astonished;'* in 1956 he had
the grace—a grace for ever denied to Thomas Hobbes—to
confess himself 'embarrassed'.6 He had need to be.
The phrase 'objective correlative' first appears in the
essay entitled Hamlet and his Problems,6 which was pub-
lished in 1919. Professor Praz had, I think, the right sow
by the lug (an Eliotian locution) in deriving the phrase
from Pound's description of poetry as 'a sort of inspired
mathematics', giving 'equations, not for abstract figures,
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triangles, spheres and the like, but equations for human
emotions.'7 You will note that, by omitting to specify the
elements of which the equations are composed, Pound
leaves the reader free to assume their being such as to
require evaluation and approval on his part. Whether or
not this was Pound's intention (and I rather think it was
not), Eliot is careful to rule it out An 'objective correla-
tive'—or 'objective equivalent', for the two terms are used
synonymously—an 'objective correlative' he defines8 as 'a
set of objects, a situation, a chain of events'—in other
words, as 'external facts'—which the reader can do no
more than perceive and which, when they are brought
before him, he cannot help perceiving. No more can he
help the 'particular emotion' rising within him, of which
the objective correlative is the formula: once 'the external
facts . . . terminate in sensory experience', says Eliot, 'the
emotion is . . . evoked'. Show a bone to a dog, and its tail
will wag. I leave you to consider the respect for the reader
which this implies.
Nor does the early Eliot merely scorn the cooperation,
he flouts the intelligence of his reader. Having prescribed
an objective correlative as 'the only way of expressing
emotion in the form of art1,9 he claims to detect, in the
Prince of Denmark, an emotion which 'is in excess of the
facts as they appear'10—an emotion, in other words, with
which nothing objective can be correlated, so that, though
apparently it has been expressed, it ought to have been
inexpressible. And in attributing the same sort of excess
to Shakespeare—who, no more than the Prince, is to be
known except in and through a work of art—Eliot contra-
dicts himself a second time. And this time, it would seem,
unnecessarily: for according to a subsequent passage in
this same essay a poet is endowed with the 'ability to
intensify the world to [the level of] his emotions'11—a
poet, that is, either need not, or cannot, be troubled with
emotions exceeding the world with which he has to deal.
What are we to conclude? That Eliot erred in his diagnosis
of Shakespeare's emotional state when writing Hamlet?
Or that Shakespeare was a heedless poet? Or a poet less
than usually able? Or—perhaps—not a poet at all? Pre-
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sumably cogitations of this kind amazed 'The troubled
midnight and the noon's repose' of the more alert among
the readers of the early Eliot.
If so, repose was restored in 1930, with the appearance
of an essay on Cyril Tourneur. A second characteristic
shared by Hobbes and Eliot is an integrity or a pig-headed-
ness—choose which word you will—which drives them to
apply theories to facts which cannot do other than shatter
the theories. 'Motion produces nothing but motion',
Hobbes repeats at the very moment of arguing that motion
produces sense.12 And if asked, 'Then must not sense and
motion be the same?' he would reply: 'No! sense is
fancy'—which is certainly not motion, whether it is sense
or not. In much the same way, Eliot on the one hand
proclaims The Revenger's Tragedy a 'masterpiece',13 pos-
sessed of 'an amazing unity' due to an 'intense and unique
and horrible vision of life;' while on the other hand he
admits that the author's 'cynicism . . . loathing and disgust
of humanity . . . exceed the object.'1* Almost the very
words, the reader recollects, which were used of Hamlet
and Shakespeare, and in consequence of which their
tragedy, 'so far from being . . . [a] masterpiece,'16 was
damned as 'most certainly an artistic failure'. Eliot inter-
venes with a sophism of the Hobbesian kind. The emotions
of the poet of The Revenger's Tragedy, he explains, do not
lack objective equivalents but, rather than characters to
be met with in the world outside, these 'seem merely to
be spectres projected from the poet's inner world of night-
mare.'16 Surely the word 'seem' is out of place in this
sentence: either the nightmare spectres project the equiva-
lents, or they do not. If not, they are intruders into the
discussion; if they do, the equivalents may remain equiva-
lents, but certainly not objective, for they are not 'facts
external' to the poet. To Eliot, of course, they are external;
but it is the poet's, and not Eliot's, emotions which, accord-
ing to the essay, are 'consummately expressed in The
Revenger's Tragedy.'17 Either the theory of the objective
correlative is capable, and stands in need of a careful
restatement, or it has been forced upon suicide.
That Pound's description of poetry should have remained
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unknown to all but a narrow circle can hardly surprise;
his talk of mathematics, equations and triangles is as
awkward and as uncomely as most, if not all, of the
utterances, whether in prose or in verse, that the unfor-
tunate Ezra was ever to make. On the other hand Eliot,
whether at his most devious or his most trenchant, was
never other than suave. But in a phrase like 'objective
correlative', it is difficult to say where suavity resides.
Does the coupling of two words with like endings convey
a touch of the scientifically irreproachable, the academically
prim? Or does a hovering doubt which of the two words
functions as substantive hint at a halo such as invests
expressions familiar from imposing contexts, 'right divine',
'wisdom infinite', 'love eternal', and so on? Perhaps the
question should not be raised as yet, perhaps not at all;
perhaps at the end we shall need to content ourselves with
noting the aptness of the warning which Cleon, son of
Cleaenetus, addressed to the Athenians:l8 that traps might
be baited with \6ywv rjSovrj, the charm of words.
'Dissociation of sensibility', the second of Eliot's current
coinages, need not detain us long: no longer than is neces-
sary to prove that the dissociation could not take place,
since the association which it presupposes never existed.
Proof lies, I think, to hand. Eliot marks off a period as that
of 'Chapman, Middleton, Webster, Tourneur, Donne', and
affirms that within this period 'the intellect was immedi-
ately at the tips of the senses.'19 Please note that he
said, not 'Chapman's, Middleton's, Webster's, Tourneur's,
Donne's intellect', but the intellect, without qualification.
Presumably therefore it was as much at the tips of Miss
Elizabeth Drury's senses as of anybody's. But if that had
been the case, Donne would hardly have considered it
worthy of record that 'her body thought'; certainly he
would not have chosen for the record the extremely
cautious language that he did choose:
her pure, and eloquent blood
Spoke in her cheeks, and so distinctly wrought
That you might almost say, her body thought.
Or if your mind repugns at the notion that a fifteen-year
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old Elizabeth Drury shared in a privilege which Eliot, you
insist, regarded as confined to the mature and great, con-
sider the case of Marvell, whose greatness and maturity
nobody can deny. If Marvell had been in the habit of
seeing a thought or thinking something green (not, of
course, thinking of something green—our excellent English,
I am afraid, accommodates itself reluctantly to the non-
sensical hypotheses which argument compels me to put
forward)—if both or either of these hypotheses had been
realized, Marvell could scarcely have accepted a 'green
thought' as the fitting annihilation of 'all that's made'. A
cause once removed, its effects are removed also; and thus
Eliot's 'eclipse' of 'something superior to the intellect',90
his 'splitting-up' of the English personality21 and so on—
all these vanish. I do not of course dispute that, in the
seventeenth as in other centuries, changes of a kind
occurred. Later perhaps I may return to their cause or
causes. At the moment my immediate point is that they
were neither so speedy nor so catastrophic as they must
have been, had they resulted from the atrophy of a psycho-
physical mechanism.
Pope, for example, who flourished under and long after
the Queen Anne by whose time Eliot supposed the faculty
of 'sensuous thought or thinking through the senses' to
have lapsed—this same Pope continues to employ conceits
and even—if I may hark back to a distinction I myself,
in a distant and callow youth, attempted to draw—even
metaphysical conceits. At times Pope employs them infelici-
tously, as when he makes Eloisa 'glue' a phantom Abelard
within her 'clasping arms'; but at times with due decorum,
so that his Atossa
by the Means defeated of the Ends,
By Spirit robb'd of Pow'r
deserves to rank alongside Eliot's Hollow Men. You will
remember the line which occurs towards the end of the
Dunciad:
And unawares Morality expires.
Whether the metaphor lying at the root of the verb
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'expires' was already effete by Pope's day, I do not know;
but if so, in this passage it is restored to pristine vigour
by contact with the skulking, shrinking, begging, calling,
gazing, raving personifications by which it is surrounded.
And so Morality, an idea, a concept, something therefore
immortal, is seen—incomprehensibly, incredibly—to yield
up her breath. If the adverb 'unawares' implies that she
does so without others knowing of it, that is horror
enough; if the dying is unknown to herself, horror is
heaped upon horror.
More often, however, Pope initiates a conceit only to
thwart it: that is, he draws its elements sufficiently close
together for both to be caught at a single glance but then,
rather than effecting their conjunction, he displays or
allows then to display their incompatibility—and the
result is a joke. In part, this may be due to the spirit of
the age, more inclined to levity than its predecessor: but
chiefly, I think the responsibility or the credit must be
laid to Pope's account, for he had much of the monkey
in him. The familiar couplet about Hampton Court may
illustrate what I mean:
Here thou, great Anna! whom three realms obey,
Dost sometimes counsel take—and sometimes Tea.
If this couplet persuaded the reader that, not only in the
same palace but by the same organ, the Queen imbibed
both a beverage and a briefing, Pope would have brought
off a metaphysical miracle. But he does not even attempt
to do so. Deliberately he chooses the verb 'take', which
has none of the precision of the verb 'imbibe'. So many
different kinds of things can be taken: thought, care,
offence, pleasure, a cure, holiday, a bus, a penny and what
not, that there would seem to be hardly any relation
between grammatical subject and grammatical object which
the verb might not deputize, for one can scarcely say
'represent', since out of such a wide range of referents it
can 'present* nothing in particular. It functions therefore
as no more than the thinnest of threads by which 'tea' and
'counsel' are linked, and from the opposite ends of which
they gibe at each other.
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Gibing takes on a different tone when the elements of
a conceit contrast more widely or more deeply than 'coun-
sel' and 'tea'. On encountering the line
Hopkins and Sternhold glad the heart with Psalms,
a reader settles down to entertainment without discomfort,
for the irony of the verb 'glad' is no more than sly. Im-
mediately succeeding lines, with their steady gravity,
bolster both himself and his illusion:
The Boys and Girls whom Charity maintains,
Implore your help in these pathetic strains:
How could Devotion touch the country pews,
Unless the Gods bestow'd a proper Muse?
Verse cheers their leisure, Verse assists their work.
But when the ear is struck by a contrast, not only between
what the poet says and what he means, but also within
his meaning, complacency is disturbed; the reader, it
seems, is to be roused from passive contemplation to some
kind of activity or other:
Verse prays for peace, Verse sings down Pope and Turk.
The likelihood of involvement grows stronger as a glance
at the pulpit not only reveals, but also excuses, a contrast
between what the occupant ought to do, and what in fact
he is doing:
The silenc'd Preacher yields to potent strain,
And feels the grace his pray'r besought in vain;
The blessing thrills thro' all the lab'ring throng—
'lab'ring' of course because the throng is composed of
labourers but also, since it is accompanied by the verb
'thrill', the adjective recalls throes like those of the
priestess at Delphi. A fear arises lest an Anglican congrega-
gation—and a rural congregation, at that!—should begin
whistling and whirling, groaning and grovelling like the
Holy Rollers, with the reader as sole judge and moderator.
But the final verse imposes silence:
And Heav'n is won by violence of Song—
for it conjures up the second element in Pope's conceit.
These are the violent of the Gospel,22 between whom and
the Anglicans no relation of similitude but only of oppug-
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nancy can obtain. However frantically the parson and his
yokels demean themselves, they can be regarded with noth-
ing but contempt by the publicans and harlots who, by
their snatching at an offered salvation, appear to outrage
Heaven; such purposeful impiety can only startle, scandal-
ise perhaps rather the yokels, and shrink them back into
their wonted warbling of insipidities. The mere thought of
their attempting anything different rouses laughter, but
this time the laughter is of the kind that greets what Eliot,
in his essay on Marlowe, calls 'the old English humour . . .
[a] terribly serious, savage comic humour'. It is a laughter
not altogether pleasant to hear.
From Pope I turn to Gray, because Eliot disapproved of
him as decidedly as he approved of Pope. I need hardly
say, but ex abundante cautela I will say, that my purpose
is not to undertake a survey of the eighteenth century, but
merely to suggest that this century neither contrasts so
sharply with its predecessor, nor contains such sharp con-
trasts within itself, as Eliot's theories, and his sometimes
wayward preferences, have led or might lead some to
suppose.
The Elegy written in a Country Churchyard still con-
tinues to use the closed conceit (and 'closed conceit', by
the way, is the name I shall use for a conceit which has
not been thwarted in the manner just described).
Ev'n from the tomb the voice of Nature cries,
Ev'n in our Ashes live their wonted Fires—
here laments and yearnings are transferred from without
to within the tomb; neither the living continue to enjoy
their wonted activity, nor the dead their wonted repose;
between life and death there seems little to choose, nor
is choice an attitude that is invited by either. But I should
be at a loss to quote any other example from the Elegy:
and, as a device to be employed by almost anyone on
almost any occasion, the closed conceit would seem to
have had its day. Henceforward it is reserved for the
exceptional poet facing an exceptional need. After all, its
habitual employment was never more than a fashion:
perhaps—to commandeer Eliot's description of Crashaw's*'
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imagery—never more than 'a deliberate conscious per-
versity of language', which was found to give 'a kind of
intellectual pleasure'. At a rough guess, I would identify
this pleasure as that of wit remodelling the world. Towards
the end of the nineteenth century, mystagogues were to
aspire to the pleasure of recreating the world, and for this
purpose invented—or at least desiderated—a new device,
which they called the symbol. Between whiles, most people
contented themselves with a more modest and more nor-
mal view of their powers. During that period language had
little to lose by a reversion to normality.
To the English language—to the English language in
poetry, anyway—it would appear to be normal neither to
close nor to thwart the conceit, but to suspend it: that is,
to awaken or to keep awake a consciousness of the
elements of a conceit, while avoiding the slightest attempt
to bring them together. Always, these elements are those
of what I once called a metaphysical conceit: persistent
and perplexing opposites such as unity and multiplicity,
death and life, flesh and spirit, time and eternity, the real
and the ideal, and whatever falls under these or like pairs.
The mind is made to savour more fully than usual the
conditions under which it is required to operate—which
may not mean of course that it relishes these conditions
more fully, but rather the opposite. The mind desires, but
cannot attain; or if it attains, does so by what the Greeks
called a divine, and is certainly not a human chance.
Stronger or more experienced spirits respond with some-
thing like a stoicism; the weaker and less prepared find
themselves dazed, puzzled, held in suspense. But this is
not the main reason why I give this form of conceit the
name that I do; rather, it is because the conceit can be
suspended over, may overarch and subtend, a whole poem,
or one or more of t ie poem's considerable parts.
And I suggest that it is normal to English poetry partly
because it is found there from the first—in Beowulf, for
example: in which morning rouses Hildeburh24 to a scene
where hitherto, and in the company of husband, son and
brother, she has had her fill of joy, and where she now sees
the brother slain at the instigation of the husband, the
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son at that of the brother; in which a father, having lost
a son to the gallows, reverts in mind to that son's house
and land, finding them eall to rum25—a phrase I can no
more than remotely render by the colloquial understate-
ment, 'too spacious by half—in which, again, the inheritor
of a vast wealth96 ruefully returns it to the earth out of
which it was dug because, as the last of his race, he can
hand it on to no one for admiration or for use.
In these three instances, the confronted opposites might
be summarily described as possession and loss; but in the
last two they are of a subtle enough kind to deserve
closer specification. They depend upon the embittered
recognition that a value, attaching to an object as long
as it remains present to a consciousness, suffers virtual
extinction once that consciousness is removed. The same
contrast, or suspended conceit, envelops a stanza of the
Elegy often dismissed as humdrum, because it is familiar:
Full many a gem of purest ray serene
The dark unfathom'd caves of ocean bear:
Full many a flower is born to blush unseen
And waste its sweetness on the desert air—
here the verb 'waste', in the last line, deplores the absence,
clamours for the presence of an observer. Mention of a
'village Hampden' and a 'mute inglorious Milton' suggests
that the conceit is to be stretched to cover succeeding
stanzas. Scruples about a 'guiltless Cromwell' however
make the poet pause, and balance the loss to be feared
from a stifling of nascent virtue against the profit to be
expected from a prevention of threatened vice. This mood
of pusillanimity anticipates the Epitaph, which is the
weakest part of the poem: indeed, the six stanzas intro-
ducing the Epitaph are also to be regretted as appendage.
Fortunately, before subsiding to their level, the poet recol-
lects that, whether or not a germ of virtue or of vice is
to be aborted in one or other of the villagers, all without
exception are future victims of the most scandalous of
wasters, Death. Gray then composes the stanzas which lead
up to the closed conceit already quoted, and which wrung
a tribute even from the reluctant Johnson. Johnson's
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judgment on the poem as a whole is, I think, remembered
by all: the Elegy, he says, 'abounds with images which
find a mirrour in every mind, and with sentiments to which
every bosom returns an echo'.
They are remembered by all, that is, except Eliot,
usually so deferential to Johnson—instead of whose com-
ment he proffers a comment of his own which must, I
think, count as the most inept ever made by a critic not
wholly contemptible on a poem not wholly without dis-
tinction. The Elegy, according to Eliot37, 'contains one or
two ideas which are perhaps not very sound: the likeli-
hood that the village churchyard, or any churchyard
contained the body of a potential Hampden, Milton or
Cromwell is exceedingly small.' There could be no more
perfect example of Ignoratio Elenchi. The category of
quantity has no relevance to a meditation moving in that
of quality. The rude forefathers of Stoke Poges (if it was
Stoke Poges) are also the rude forefathers of every hamlet,
indeed of all mankind, whether rude or not; and whatever
the fact, the mere possibility that a genius should be
slighted—or, for that matter, a nincompoop—this suffices
to distress, not merely sentimentalists like Mackenzie and
Laurence Sterne, but all thinkers sound and honest enough
to distinguish between what they tolerate because they
must, and what, if free from the compulsion of reality,
they would find tolerable.
This impercipience on Eliot's part—you can find more
of it, and worse, in After Strange Gods—should be born in
mind when weighing the terms of an earlier comment
included in the essay on the Metaphysical Poets: 'the feel-
ing, the sensibility expressed in the Country Churchyard',
Eliot writes,28'. . . is cruder than that in the Coy Mistress'.
Of the Country Churchyard I have said more than enough;
of the Coy Mistress I will say that it includes passages I
admire greatly, but also that, if commissioned to select, from
the whole body of English poetry, the lines most properly
to be qualified as 'crude', I do not know that, outside
avowed pornography, I could make a juster choice than of
the last six lines of the Coy Mistress.
If, as I have suggested, the suspended conceit is normal
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to English poetry, it should not only put in an appearance
at the beginning, but persist until the end of that poetry.
It persists at any rate into the nineteenth century, in the
early years of which we find a poem that might be said
to enact the triumph of the suspended over the closed
conceit This is the Ode to a Nightingale, of which Eliot,
in one of the earliest of his essays,29 sketched an account
I do not propose to quote. As one of the sarcasms in which
he abounded, it is one of the driest and least pleasant. The
elements of the conceit in the Ode are, on the one hand,
the misery of a world
Where palsy shakes a few, sad, last gray hairs,
Where youth grows pale, and spectre-thin, and dies;
Where but to think is to be full of sorrow—
and, on the other hand, a happiness revealed by a burst
of singing from the nightingale. This happiness is so
unexpected by the poet, and so novel, that it dazes as
might a drug. Such a daze cannot be trusted to last, and
that it may do so for some not negligible period the poet has
recourse to intoxication by wine, by poetry, even by the
thought of death. But all these are self-defeating: happi-
ness can be securely held only if associated with death's
opposite; and so from 'sod', the deadest of all dead words,
the poet soars, in a single line, to the closed conceit:
Thou wast not born for death, immortal Bird!
And once immortalized, the nightingale naturally has sung,
naturally is singing, everywhere and to everyone: to
emperor and clown as well as to John Keats, over perilous
seas and alien corn as well as over Highgate. But wit is
no longer capable of remodelling the world as once it did;
the poet finds no more than fancy at his disposal, and
fancy he knows deceives. The conceit has hardly been closed
before it begins to gape. From happy, the nightingale's
song turns to plaintive; the bird no longer sings, not even
over Highgate.
Was it a vision, or a waking dream?
Fled is that music;—do I wake or sleep?
The poet relapses into a daze, as at the beginning of the
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ode; but this time the daze is of a different kind—not the
fleeting effect of a drug, but a permanent puzzlement, a
suspense, as I have called it, between happiness and misery,
two states that cannot be reconciled, but neither of which
can henceforth be ignored.
If this betrays a weakness in Keats, by contrast with
which Matthew Arnold calls to be commended for strength,
it must be remembered that, when he wrote the Ode, Keats
was no more than 25, and that Arnold, in writing The
Scholar-Gipsy, possessed the advantage, not only of five
additional years, but of a thorough moral training and a
solid mental discipline. Not only does Arnold salute his
Gipsy with the words
No, no, thou hast not felt the lapse of hours—
he shows him, in the person of the Tyrian trader 'indig-
nantly' refusing to feel it. This word 'indignantly' is the
most important in the poem; the Tyrian unhesitatingly
turns his back on the 'merry Grecian coaster', on
The young light-hearted masters of the waves,
on the grapes, the wine, the figs, the tunnies that they
bring—delights that, within the frame of the simile, corre-
spond to the delights of the Berkshire countryside; much
as the Greeks themselves represent the Berkshire shep-
herds at their beer, the Oxford barbarians at their bathing
and their hunts. With the former of these the Gipsy has
hitherto dallied; now he realizes that he can dally with
neither—rather must he face a raving Atlantic and cliffs
cloudy with 'sheets of foam'. Henceforth his sole com-
panions, if they can be denominated such, are to be dark
and shy, that is to say mysterious traffickers. The suspense
he has made up his mind to endure, the conceit by which
the poem is englobed, is that between a One that must
be searched for, and an ignorance where or whether it can
be found. No stoicism could be more tragic.
Though I too fear to dally, it seems impossible to
abandon the Victorians without a glance at what I suppose
must be accepted as their representative, if imperfect,
masterpiece, Idylls of the King. It is imperfect because
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written 'With one Auspicious, and one Dropping eye'—
with one eye fixed on the blameless Prince Consort, that
is, and the other on the guileless, and therefore blame-
worthy Arthur. Though Tennyson fails to distinguish as
carefully as he might—or at least, as carefully as he
ought—between the concepts of blame and guile, after a
measure of familiarity with the poem the matter of the
Prince Consort falls away like a husk. Arthur then stands
revealed as a King who, with what he takes to be the best
of intentions but what in fact are the worst, since they are
unallayed by prudence, leads his knights to destruction,
both severally and as a body. Appropriately, the cycle
begins and ends with humanity in a daze: Camelot moves
'so weirdly in the mist' that Gareth and his companions,
as they approach, doubt 'whether there be any city at all';
in his 'last, dim, weird battle in the west' Arthur 'saw not
whom he fought. For friend and foe were shadows in
the mist' Once more, we are back with Beowulf: not only,
and not so much, with Beowulfs followers as they hew
on every hand in a vain attempt to aid their leader,30 as
with the wise Wiglaf31 who, towards the end of the poem,
reflects on the leader's imprudence. By what seemed to
him a heroic self-sacrifice, Beowulf thought to establish
his people in a safe prosperity; instead, he has brought
them face to face with extinction, the menfolk to be killed
in battle, the womenfolk sold into slavery.
I hasten to return to the seventeenth century, and to the
true cause of such changes as the century in fact knew.
Eliot, I think, dropped a hint of the cause, when in his
essay on Marvell32 he remarked that 'the spirit of the age
was coming to be the French spirit of the age'. Here it
behoves me to step warily, since I have lived too long in
lands dominated by French culture not to be aware of the
heinousness of the sin of Francophobia, or of the ease with
which, in the eyes of the jealous guardians of that culture,
Francophobia may beset us—or at least beset me. Every-
thing however—even eternal disrepute must be risked in
the cause of truth. Let me therefore make bold to deny
that the suspended conceit, which I have described as
normal to English poetry, is normal to the French—not at
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least until the latter half of the nineteenth century. In
earlier times strain and perplexity such as are consequent
upon the conceit may perhaps receive occasional expres-
sion in French; but not—and this, I think, is highly signi-
ficant—not from writers whom the French claim as their
chief glories. How often have we heard critics eloquently
extol the absence of strain from Chretien de Troyes, or
of any obstacle to the ready comprehension of his verses:
verses which flow, the critics boast, as smooth and clear
as water! How often, in the midst of a perusal of Cliges
or Erec or Lancelot have we felt our belly stretched to
bursting, and marvelled that the critics seem never to have
heard of the water torment. How often, turning over works
of the Grand Sidcle—unless works of dissidents or lone
wolves—have we regretted that Descartes should so suc-
cessfully have cleared of mystery every nook and cranny
of the universe: except, of course, from the pineal gland,
which no one ever talks about anyway. For as a conse-
quence, the literature of that Siecle became the narrowest
and most superficial of any that have been called 'great'.
Propagated to the ends of Europe by the ruthlessness and
riot of Louis XIV—his ruthlessness on the battlefield, his
riot at Versailles—it had the effect of a Upas Tree on all
the naJtive literatures thalt came under its shadow. In
England too literature suffered, though no more than a
partial blight thanks to sound traditions dating back to
the seventh century such as no Continental literature
possessed. By 1700, I would say, the worst effects were
overcome; leaving behind them no more than a tendency
to levity to which I have already referred, and an undue
straining after clarity or, to use words of Eliot's own, after
'the imposition of a unity greater than life will bear.'33
Here I am offered the opportunity, which I must not fail
to seize, of explaining what perhaps seemed an offensive
word on my opening presentation of Eliot. The word is
'landlouper'—I do not like it, but could think of none
better; and I particularly deplore its use if I have seemed
to ridicule Eliot's change of nationality and domicile.
Myself I have suffered too long as an exile not to feel the
fullest sympathy with all who seek a refuge in Britain.
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What I had in mind in choosing the word was the habit
of literate Americans, whether born north or south of
Panama—or what at any rate used to be their habit, as
long as I had anything to do with those parts—the habit
of learning French as soon as, or sometimes it almost
seemed sooner than, their native tongue. Unless what I
have just been suggesting about literature in French is
wholly mistaken, the consequences of the habit could
hardly be other than regrettable. In Eliot's case, two of
the consequences have been particularly so.
The first is due to contagion with French provincialism.
'Tout ce qui n'est pas logique n'est pas francais', a French-
man will say; but if you examine him at all closely, you
will find that he means 'tout ce qui n'est pas francais n'est
pas logique'. And if you press your examination to the
furthest point, you will not of course compel him to admit
the belief, but you yourself will grow convinced of his
holding the belief, that 'tout ce qui n'est pas fran^ais n'est
rien'.3* Relieved in tils way of any duty to extend his
knowledge, the Frenchman finds ready answers to ques-
tions of the widest import. Emboldened by the example of
such a readiness—for I can think of no other explanation
which might be even remotely adequate—Eliot ventured
on such a statement as the following:M 'I think . . . of the
literature of the world, of the literature of Europe, of the
literature of a single country, not as a collection of the
writings of individuals, but as 'organic wholes', as systems
in relation to which, individual works of literary art, and
the works of individual artists, have their significance'.
To realize to the full the arrogance of this statement, it
should be borne in mind that 'organic whole' is a technical
term, and that Eliot marks it as such by inverted commas.
He takes it over from the so-called 'idealist/ philosophy
into which he was initiated at Harvard, and with which
he was stuffed at Oxford. According to this philosophy, an
organic whole is such, not only that a knowledge of itself
presupposes a knowledge of all its parts; but also that
knowledge of any one of these parts presupposes a know-
ledge of the whole. Leaving on one side as none of our
business the logic of this statement, I concentrate on its
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practical consequences. To judge, say, a lyric by Campion
we must relate it to a whole the number of whose com-
ponents is infinite, and which we cannot know without
each of these components being known. The demand on
our capacities, were it not impossible, would be absurd;
nor would its absurdity decrease if what we desired to
judge were not a single lyric, but the whole of Campion's
production, or the whole of the works of Shakespeare.
Fortunately, in taking over the French habit of making
sweeping generalizations, Eliot also takes over the highly
intelligent French habit—or should I rather call it a Latin
habit?—of neglecting generalizations, once they threaten
inconvenience. Having referred to world literature in the
sentence I quoted, as far as I remember Eliot never mentions
it again. And European literature he quickly reduces to
what is for him a manageable size. Writings in Greek he
sets aside on pretexts36 that cannot be described as other
than frivolous; and apart from studies of Virgil, Seneca,
Dante and Machiavelli—this last very short, and later
repudiated—he trims the Latin tradition in writing down
to a French tradition. As far as his notion of Europe is
concerned, writing might never have been undertaken in
any Slav, Celtic or Germanic language—except, of course,
in English.
And for viewing English literature as a whole he was
incapacitated by what seems to have been a minimal
acquaintance with what Englishmen wrote in medieval
times. Never once does he mention Beowulf, and a famili-
arity with Beowulf seems to me as indispensable to a sound
literary judgment as, down to the end of their culture, a
familiarity with Homer seemed to the Greeks. That Eliot
possessed hardly an inkling of the nature of Old English
verse is shown by his repeated praise37 of Pound's transla-
tion of The Seafarer, which can only be described as comic.
Although in 1942 he acknowledged as 'monumental'
Professor R. W. Chambers's paper on The Continuity of
English Prose,33 he was never moved to retract his frequent
reproaches against prose in English for lagging behind
the French. His references to Chaucer39 are perfunctory;
his sole reference to Piers Plowman® depreciatory; he
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makes no reference at all to Sir Gawain and the Green
Knight, in which, rather than in the Frenchified Chaucer,
the Englishness of English writing receives expression.
Everyman appears to have served as his sole authority*1
for the qualities and purposes of medieval drama: this
apostle of a united literary Europe appears to have been
ignorant of drama in Spain, where congeners of Everyman
continued to be produced, and to be produced with out-
standing success, down to the seventeenth century. In his
first paper on Milton, Eliot declared it a 'right and neces-
sary attitude'*2 to be adopted to any poet to measure him
against 'outside standards, most pertinently by the stan-
dards of language and of something called Poetry, in our
own language and in the whole history of European litera-
ture'. Why then, instead of contenting himself with noting
an influence of Spenser on Marlowe, did he not measure
The Faerie Queene against the production of Ariosto,
Tasso, Ercilla, Camoens, and so expose it—for it deserves
to be exposed—as the Gabbiest poem of its kind? If, in his
second paper on Milton*3, Eliot was desirous of praising
the structure of Paradise Lost, the merits of which have
been doubted, why did ne not seek to establish these
merits by comparison with some few at least of the Biblical
epics with which Europe of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries abounded? The question of the versification of
Paradise Lost I leave to one side, for that must, it seems
to me, entail a discussion of Eliot's own verse; I cannot
however suppress my astonishment at his treatment of
Comus, his sole quotation from which** seems to have been
maliciously chosen to underpin the preposterous opinion
that 'Milton's sensuousness . . . had been withered early
by book-learning'. Perhaps the influence of Swinburne is
to be suspected, whose preference for a gamey Faithful
Shepherdess over the chaste Comus*6 is readily compre-
hensible; hardly however Eliot's, whose features were by
no means the only things about him 'of clerical cut'. The
Sacred Wood reprints an outrageously favourable review
of Swinburne's criticism; and it is perhaps as a camp-
follower of Swinburne's that he overvalued, as I do not
doubt that he did overvalue, the early seventeenth century
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dramatists. At his overvaluing of the metaphysical poets,
and its consequences, I have already more than hinted.
I hasten, since time presses, to the second of the unfor-
tunate effects upon Eliot of his early impregnation with
French. This is to be traced to the strong reaction against
post-Cartesian rationalism which, as the nineteenth century
wore on towards the twentieth, gave to Paris an ever-
increasing resemblance to an aesthetic madhouse. Some of
its inmates implored a descent of the irrational from above,
others conjured its eruption from below. As the former
were in the habit of regarding poets as mystics, super-
theologians, even Messiahs, Catholic orthodoxy probably
forbade Eliot's joining their ranks; from about 1920
onwards he shows an increasing, if always cautious, ten-
dency to militate alongside the latter. In 1921, for example,
he warns writers against looking into the heart, rather than
into humbler and more ignoble parts of the body: 'the
cerebral cortex, the nervous system, and the digestive
tracts'.48 Warnings to wait upon what I shall allow myself
to call the more ignoble parts of the soul—the parts, that
is, lying below consciousness—recur with such frequency
that I must content myself with quoting no more than one
of them, and of the latest. It comes from a defence of
E. A. Poe, dating from 1948. Eliot is sure, he says, that Poe
wrote poetry and not verse because what he wrote47 Tias
the effect of an incantation which, because of its very
crudity, stirs the feelings at a deep and almost primitive
level'. In the scale of musical instruments, I do not sup-
pose you can descend lower than the tom-tom; in the scale
of feelings, what could be lower than those roused by the
tom-tom in the breast of savages, whether of the nursery
or of the jungle?
Here we meet with a conception of the literary art vastly
different from that displayed in one of the earliest and still,
I suppose, one of the most notorious of Eliot's essays: the
essay entitled Tradition and the Individual Talent, assigned
by t ie first edition of the Selected Essays to the year 1917.
This withdraws the work of art so far from the stench and
noise of any jungle as to be inhumanly free from either:
as sterile as an instrument in an operating theatre, as
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unvocal as an image in a church. Produced, it would seem,
by the fortuitous concourse of 'numberless feelings, phrases,
images'*8 stored in the mind as a mere receptacle, the work
of art bears no trace of a mind about it, for that would
prejudice its purity. Not without a feeling of justification,
therefore, Eliot adapts phrases from the Gospel: 'The
Arts', he intones,*9 'insist that man shall dispose of all that
he has . . . and follow art alone.' Certainly a man must
dispose, that is, he must get rid of, what he usually values
most highly: his personality, or his very self.
Professor Wollheim, I see, attributes this theory60 to
F. H. Bradley's 'peculiarly empty or hollow way of con-
ceiving the mind'. Though loath to put a limit to any evil
that Bradley might diffuse, I cannot help thinking that part
at least of the responsibility must be charged to Clive
Bell, whose book, entitled Art, and published in 1912, con-
tains many terms, phrases, sentences even, which Eliot, I
would say, no more than echoes. Clive Bell's views pro-
vided matter for lively discussion by the Bloomsbury
group during the years when Eliot, newly arrived in
London, cultivated a more than a nodding acquaintance
with its members.
If summoned to explain this half-revolution in Eliot's
views—this turning through an angle of 180 degrees, I
mean—I must beg permission to refer once more—but for
the last time—to Thomas Hobbes. When so inextricably
involved in a theory that its mere appearance might prove
an embarassment, Hobbes naturally took none of the
trouble we have previously seen him take: saving the
appearance, that is, even at the cost of killing the theory.
He merely put the theory behind his back and forgot about
it. As Eliot notes,51 the universe as constructed by Hobbes
leaves no room for consciousness. But when constructing
a commonwealth Hobbes found consciousness indispens-
able; without more ado therefore, and one might almost
say blithely, he assumed that consciousness existed.
And here I have to draw a contrast rather than a paral-
lelism between Hobbes and Eliot. After all, the latter was
endowed with a far suppler—I do not know that I would
say a far subtler, but a far suppler—mind. Eliot sought to
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retain whatever of value hung about a theory he was on
the point of abandoning; and the new theory which was
to replace it he introduced so gradually, so cautiously,
that often it is difficult to know what he would be at.
Hence the arduous trials to which he subjects his would-
be admirers. If, as he more than once repeated, his criticism
was written in order that his poetry might improve; that
criticism is read by ourselves and others in order that our
own criticism should not deteriorate so thoroughly as
otherwise it might. But we do not always find it at all easy
to disengage the essence, the central substance, of what
Eliot seems to be saying.
The dehumanization of a work of literary art, for
example, has at least this merit; it frees the work from any
biographical or historical rubbish with which, owing to
long and evil custom, it may have been encumbered. 'To
divert interest from the poet to the poetry is a laudable
aim',63 Eliot proclaimed at the outset of his career, in 1917;
in 1953, towards the end of that career, he delivered a warn-
ing to the same effect:m 'If, on the basis of what poets try
to tell you, or by biographical research, with or without the
tools of the psychologist, you attempt to explain a poem,
you will probably be getting further and further away from
the poem without arriving at any other destination.'
So far, so good—indeed I would say, so far very good.
But how, and to extent, is a work of literary art to be
made human? What exactly can Eliot mean when, in 1920,
he speaks" of the 'lifetime's work of Marlowe and Jonson'
as 'the transformation of a personality into a personal work
of art'? When, in 1932, he describes5* 'the essential' of the
poetry of Marlowe, Jonson, Chapman, Middleton, Webster,
Tourneur as the giving of 'the pattern, . . . the undertone
of the personal emotion, the personal drama and struggle,
which no biography, however full and intimate, could give
us': when he writes thus, is he not opening to the door to
a kind of biography at least as fantastic as the criticism
of which he accuses Goethe and Coleridge? These latter,
according to Eliot,56 read their life-stresses into Hamlet;
now it seems we are invited to read life-stresses out of any
similar work. Nor am I comforted, but rather the opposite,
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by the memory of a denial, published in 1924,67 that an
artist 'produces great art by a deliberate attempt to express
his personality. He expresses his personality indirectly', we
were told in that year, 'through concentrating on a task
which is a task in the same sense as the making of an
efficient engine or the turning of a jug or table-leg'. This
seems either a throw-back to the dehumanisation theory,
according to which, if not the whole, at least the best part
of a poem is produced fortuitously, and without the
cooperation or even the knowledge of a mind; or if not
a throw-back, then the denial is a foreshadowing of auto-
matic composition, or some charlatanry of the sort—a sort
to which the later Eliot, no doubt under Parisian influences,
tended more and more to incline. In 1940 perhaps he
sighted this or a similar danger ahead, for he attempted68
both a Solomonic judgment and a restoration of the mind
to its rightful dignity. The composition of lyrics such as
those of Lovelace or Suckling or Campion, he suggested,
may be compared to the turning of a jug or a leg; but other
poems exist in which the author, 'out of intense and per-
sonal experience, is able to express a general truth; retain-
ing all the particularity of his experience, to make of it
a general symbol'. I do not know whether this dichotomy
can be admitted; its second branch however I should
heartily welcome, did not later passages in the lecture—
it is the lecture on Yeats—make it clear that Eliot is think-
ing not so much of poems singly, as of the whole body of
poetry that a poet may have produced—what the French
call his oeuvre. And here I see the continued workings of
the nefarious theory of 'organic wholes': workings respon-
sible for a number of startling statements of which I quote
only the one which startles the most—"The whole of
Shakespeare's work is one poem', writes Eliot,69 underlin-
ing the word 'one'. Such a statement seems to me either
meaningless, or plainly false in its meaning.
But let me turn to another topic on which, for a time at
any rate, Eliot stoutly defends a right and proper view.
This is the topic of music. In 1941 Eliot gives a warning
which is as necessary as it is often neglected:m a warning
'that the use of the word "musical" and of musical anal-
ELIOT'S CRITICISM 355
ogies in discussing poetry has its dangers if we do not
constantly check its limitations: for the music of verse is
inseparable from the meanings and associations of words'.
In the following year he reinforced the warning with the
statement61 that 'the music of poetry is not something
which exists apart from the meaning. Otherwise, we could
have poetry of great musical beauty which made no sense,
and I have never come across such poetry.' Accordingly,
and as far as I know, to the end of his life he remained
untainted by the Parisian heresy of la poisie pure. But,
but . . . and alas that so many occasions for a 'but' should
arise when discussing Eliot's prose! But why, having
stressed as we have just heard him stress the dangers of
musical analogies, does he go on to talk of 'a musical
pattern of the secondary meaning of words',® of 'a music
of imagery', of a 'musical design' to be discovered in
'particular scenes' of Shakespeare, 'and in his more perfect
plays as wholes',63 of a 'subterrene or submarine music'6*
reverberating beneath, it would seem, all drama that is
successfully poetic? Do not such utterances amount to, or
at least make for, a darkening of counsel? And to descend
to humbler matters: why does Eliot repeatedly insist that
passages from poems in languages imperfectly understood
are capable of 'transporting'66 the reader? How does he
find it possible to forget, for example, the priest firmly
convinced of the theological cogency of his mumpsimus,
the Victorian spinster sucking a soul's nutriment from the
word 'Mesopotamia', or Mallarm^, with no more know-
ledge of English than befits a secondary school teacher,
including his famous line.
Donner un sens plus pur aux mots de la tribu—
including this famous line in a tribute to the poet whose
main mission it would seem to have been to remove every
vestige of sense from as many English words as possible?
And when, though refraining from acknowledging their
situation as 'ideal', he honours with his notice66 poets so
impatient of 'meaning' as to 'perceive possibilities of
intensity through its elimination'—does not this notice
confer viability upon a charlatanry as asthenic as it is
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insolent, and which should have been left, unpitied, to gasp
out its life?
If analogies drawn from music are dangerous, those
drawn from logic are yet more so. To myself, I must
confess, they have always appeared impenetrably opaque.
To say that things are logically connected implies that
reason connects them; to deny that a connection is reason-
able and at the same time maintain that it is logical is to
say nothing at all—or, as I remember Mr. F. W. Bateson
observing,67 it is to claim for oneself possession of a logic
unknown to the vulgar and so a whiphand over the latter.
Mr. Bateson quotes an instance from the essay on Ben
Jonson, dating from 1919; I myself shall quote one which
dates from 1931. It occurs in the Preface to Eliot's transla-
tion of the Anabase of St-John Perse. Having asserted68
that 'there is a logic of the imagination as well as a logic
of concepts', Eliot goes on: 'People who do not appreciate
poetry find it difficult to distinguish between order and
chaos in the arrangement of images'. The threat is clear:
either make the distinction, or confess that you do not
appreciate poetry. In a note by M. Lucien Fabre, appended
to the second edition of the translation, the threat
developes into a bludgeoning: ^  'It is a proof of the right-
ness of this kind of poetry', says M. Fabre, 'that there are
no keys to it, no conventions, no dictionaries, and that all
who are worthy of feeling its import are moved to tears'.
Gentlemen, I refuse to be bludgeoned, even to tears.
And of course I refuse to take part in any bludgeoning.
That the temptation is not always resisted is shown by a
comparatively recent edition of Chaucer's charming but
trivial poem The Parliament of Birds.70 Unless the triviality
is recognised, this poem offers certain difficulties of inter-
pretation. An editor is of course the last person to acknow-
ledge the triviality of the work he edits, and so Eliot's
'logic of the imagination' is resorted to in order to brow-
beat the reader into denying existence to the difficulties.
We owe it, I think, to the good name of Eliot to see that
this habit does not spread.
For of course Eliot has a good name: and, though I
have taken up far more of your time than is conscionable,
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I am more afraid of the charge of having said too little
than too much—too little, I mean, of the good things
which abound in Eliot. But why emphasize these, when
they are already so well and so widely known? His prose
is a huge gallimaufry. And if I had begun by scooping out
succulent morsels such as Milton's building of a Chinese
Wall, Seneca's characters all speaking with the same voice
and at the top of that voice, Beaumont and Fletcher's cut
flowers withering as they are stuck in the sand—had I
done so, fairness would I am afraid have compelled me to
lay before you portions more indigestible than any rejected
by the leopards in Ash Wednesday: Eliot's persistent
denigration of G. M. Hopkins, for example, his equally
persistent overvaluation of James Joyce, his doltish—I am
sorry for the word, but can think of no other even
remotely adequate—his doltish praise71 of Joyce as a more
religious writer than Hopkins. Instead, I have sought to
indicate a mistaken, and I think important, perspective on
his part—and a perpetual, not always perhaps quite candid,
hovering between systems.
But I should prefer us to take leave of him on the best
of possible terms. We are all University teachers of English
and, as you know, he was not over-inclined to view our
profession favourably. Let us heap coals of fire on his head
by taking two of his recommendations to heart. The one
isra that our pupils should be instructed in philosophy,
logic and history—history of language, I take it, since a
long servitude to thesis-writing as it is practised on the
Continent and in America has convinced me of a funda-
mental incompatibility between the mind of the political
or social historian and that of the literary critic. We may
have need of the former as our servants, we cannot admit
them as our assessors. On the other hand, scarcely a morn-
ing passes without my being shocked by solecisms—sol-
ecisms of syntax and of pronunciation—committed by
those who announce news over the B.B.C. They would not,
I think, be allowed to do so in any other European country;
they thicken the veil between the present generation and
the literature of the past: they bear witness to a grave
defect in our system of instruction. Eliot's second recom-
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mendation is both more subtle and more important. It is
that we should not recommend, still less force, young
people to grapple with poetry they do not find 'naturally
congenial'; for if we do, we expose them73 to the 'grave
danger of deadening their sensibility to poetry and con-
founding the genuine development of taste with the sham
acquisition of it.'
All of us, I think, recognise the danger, but the question
arises: How is the danger to be exorcised while inducing,
as we must endeavour to induce, young people to find
those poems congenial which they should so find? The
answer lies outside my terms of reference, but of one thing
I feel sure: we must inculcate an absolute honesty in deal-
ing with words. And so, as I feared towards the opening
of this paper, I am forced back on the testimony of Cleon,
son of Cleaenetus. I regret I must cite so disreputable a
witness on my behalf, but—to adapt words used by Eliot
on a different occasion—we are none of us perfect, and
must take our wisdom as we find it. Let us then profit by
such wisdom as the worthless Cleon was able to gather,
and refuse to be dazzled by surface charm. We must
examine the uses to which words are put, lest they lure
us into traps—which may disable us for a moment per-
haps, but perhaps also for a lifetime.
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"It is perhaps supererogatory to remind readers of the
opinions upon Shakespeare expressed by the eminent
Francophile Frederick the Great: 'ces abominable, pieces
. . . ces farces ridicules, et dignes des sauvages du Canada'
(De la litt&rature allemande, p. 46). But the following
passage, kindly brought to my notice by Professor E. M.
Wilson, possesses perhaps other virtues besides that of
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novelty. The author of a Journal du Voyage d'Espagne,
contenant une description fort exacte de ses Royaumes &
de ses principales Villes . . ., published at Paris in 1682,
describes how 'le Marquis de Liche, le seul Seigneur Espag-
nol qui ait quelque maniere de Cour . . . et monsieur de
Barriere, me vinrent prendre pour aller a une vieille
Comedie qu'on avoit rejouee de nouveau, qui ne valait
rien, quoy qu'elle fust de D. Pedro Calderon. J'allay aussi
voir cet Auteur quie est le plus grand Poete et le plus bel
esprit qu'ils ayent presentement. II est Chevalier de 1'ordre
de saint Jacques et Chapelain de la Chapelle de los Reyes
a Tolede, mais a sa conversation je vis bien qu'il ne scavoit
grand'chose, quoy qu'il soit de"ja tout blanc. Nous dis-
putasmes un peu sur les regies de la Dramatique, qu'ils ne
connoissent point en ce Pays-la, et dont ils se moquent.'
pp. 189, 171. 'Je vis bien qu'il ne scavoit grand'chose'—to
anyone who has not only read but heard a speech by
General de Gaulle the accent is unmistakable.
^SE 23.
36
 Cf. OPP 61.
^TCC 173, UPUC 38.
^ C C 147.
39UPUC 4, ES 102, EAM 98, OPP 60, 63, 115, 181, 196.
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Professor Smith died before he could pass the proofs of
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